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The Case Against Third-Party 
Funding in Investment Arbitration
Frank J. Garcia
INSIghT 2
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Annulment Proceeding, (Apr. 28, 2011); Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs 
v. Republic of Georgia., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/15, Award (March 3, 2010); 
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as reported by Hepburn, J. (2011, August). ICSID annulment proceeding is 
discontinued in Jordan construction case, as third-party funding is again flagged. 
Investment Arbitration Reporter.
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Third-party litigation funding (TPF) is a rapidly 
expanding industry composed of speculative investors 
who invest in a legal claim for control of the case and a 
contingency in the recovery.1 In the wake of the global 
financial crisis and the demand by speculative finance for 
new investment vehicles, TPF has discovered the regime 
of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with investor–state 
dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanisms. 
The high costs and potentially high damages 
characteristic of ISDS cases have made it a new and 
highly attractive market for TPF. It is difficult to 
estimate the scale of TPF in ISDS today, since TPF 
funders generally prefer not to disclose their role 
to the other parties or to the arbitrators. However, 
available evidence suggests an already significant role, 
with TPF (actual or alleged) at issue in several recent 
ISDS cases.2 With many jurisdictions beginning to 
recognize the impact of TPF and its unique role in 
international investment arbitration, it is important to 
consider whether TPF is consistent with the goals of 
the investment law regime and the values and interests 
states must advance and protect.
An exploitation mechanism impairing 
rather than advancing access to justice
TPF proponents argue that it provides a number of 
benefits across a range of dispute settlement platforms, 
including promoting access to justice and filtering out 
unmeritorious cases. Whatever the merits of TPF in civil 
and commercial litigation, in the investment arbitration 
context the traditional justifications for TPF are upended 
and the risks of TPF magnified. The legal context of 
ISDS (asymmetric treaties) and its political economy 
(awards are paid by states out of public funds, and cases 
are settled or lost by states in two-thirds of the disputes) 
raise important concerns about TPF unique to the 
investment arbitration context.
TPF within a system as unbalanced as the investment 
law regime is, to put it bluntly, an exploitation. 
Exploitation has been defined as a form of “unfair 
advantage-taking.”3 TPF is explicitly designed to take 
advantage of the asymmetric structure of the investment 
regime today for the benefit of speculative finance. The 
funding model is predicated on a system in which states 
have no substantive rights under the treaties, claimants 
have a direct voice in the selection of arbitrators and 
there is no right of appeal.4 Moreover, the global 
investment climate makes ignoring an arbitral award 
a risky course of conduct for any respondent state 
concerned with its investment rating.
TPF gives a small class of investors even more resources 
to pursue unbalanced claims against constrained states. 
These claims come at a significant cost to target countries 
and their citizens, since these claims will ultimately be 
paid by a large underrepresented class of stakeholders: the 
public, who as taxpayers are the “residual risk-bearers” 
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in the current system. Developing country respondents 
are particularly vulnerable. Research suggests the vast 
majority (88 per cent) of all claimant investors are from 
high-income countries, and developing countries win only 
half as often as developed countries.5 TPF funders have 
admitted that these factors enter into their preliminary 
evaluation of a potential claim or “investment.”6
TPF thus effects a wealth transfer to TPF funders and 
their investors from the citizens of respondent states 
through the operation of the BIT/ISDS regime. Such 
transfers are not what the investment regime was 
designed to achieve. On the contrary, such transfers 
seem the opposite in spirit to the basic investment 
principle of no expropriation without compensation. 
Moreover, these wealth transfers would seem to reverse 
a widely accepted norm of fairness, amounting to an 
uncompensated taking from the less-favoured many for 
the benefit of the privileged few.
TPF proponents in ISDS have sought justification 
in traditional TPF rationales, arguing that funding of 
investment claims provides access to justice for investors 
who wish to seek redress but lack sufficient financial 
resources. This is a view favoured by funders, as it frames 
their role as a vital one that facilitates and contributes to 
global economic justice. However, in the ISDS context, 
this rationale is fundamentally flawed—the role of TPF 
in ISDS cannot be equated with providing financing for 
disadvantaged claimants.7 
Traditionally, access to justice has meant capacity 
building for social justice, that is, the provision 
of financing or other support for parties who lack 
the human and financial resources to litigate. In 
contrast, TPF in ISDS is primarily about balance-
sheet management, offering typically well-resourced 
claimants the ability to minimize the risk associated 
with bringing a claim, and does not focus on providing 
funding to impecunious or disadvantaged claimants.8 
In the words of a leading TPF funder, “much of the 
focus of the litigation finance market today is on the 
growing corporate utilization of funding by large, well-
resourced entities, who are looking for ways to manage 
risk, reduce legal budgets or take the cost of pursuing 
arbitration off-balance sheet, or other business reasons 
for not wanting to allocate resources to financing an 
arbitration matter.”9
In fact, when one considers access to justice in its 
broadest social context, TPF actually impairs access to 
justice for developing country respondent states and 
their citizens. TPF funding exacerbates the inherent 
imbalance in the BIT regime, disproportionately 
affecting already disadvantaged states’ ability to 
control regulatory change within their borders and 
deliver important social welfare benefits. Instead, 
TPF further shifts power and resources towards 
private investors, which can in turn have a negative 
impact on the political affairs and social welfare of 
developing countries. Public health, public safety 
and environmental protection measures have all been 
challenged under the BIT/ISDS regime. Developing 
country states can further ill afford the burden to 
public finances that even non-public welfare arbitration 
claims will create when paid out of the public fisc.10
The way forward on TPF in ISDS: 
Policy options
For all of these reasons, TPF as it is currently designed 
cannot play a constructive role in investment arbitration 
until TPF is regulated and the BIT/ISDS regime is 
significantly reformed. Allowing speculative finance a 
5 Schultz, T., & Dupont, C. (2014). Investment arbitration: Promoting the rule 
of law or over-empowering investors? A quantitative empirical study. European 
Journal of International Law, 25(4), 1147–1168.
6 Round Table Discussion on Third Party Funding in Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement with ICCA/Queen Mary Task Force on Third-Party Funding in 
International Arbitration, Columbia Ctr. for Sustainable Inv., in N.Y.C., N.Y 
(Oct. 17, 2017).
7 See Santosuosso, T. & Scarlett, R. (2018). Third-party funding in investment 
arbitration: Misappropriation of access to justice rhetoric by global speculative finance. 
Boston College Law School Law and Justice in the Americas Working Paper No. 8. 
Retrieved from http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ljawps/8 
8 Ibid. 
9 Bogart, C. P. (2016, October 14). Third-party financing of international 
arbitration. In Global Arbitration Review (pub.), The European Arbitration Review 
2017. Retrieved from https://globalarbitrationreview.com/insight/the-european-
arbitration-review-2017/1069316/third-partyfinancing-of-international-arbitration. 
Christopher Bogart is the co-founder and CEO of Burford Capital.
10 See generally Eberhardt, P. & Olivet, C. (2012, November 27). Profiting from 
injustice: How law firms, arbitrators and financiers are fueling an investment 
arbitration boom. Retrieved from https://www.tni.org/en/briefing/profiting-injustice
"TPF effects a wealth transfer to 
TPF funders and their investors 
from the citizens of respondent 
states through the operation of the 
BIT/ISDS regime. Such transfers are 
not what the investment regime 
was designed to achieve."
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stake in the outcome and a voice in the determination 
of which cases to bring, which arbitrators to choose and 
which cases to settle amounts to nothing less than a 
deliberate exploitation of the flaws in the BIT regime for 
the benefit of speculators and at the cost of respondent 
states, their taxpayers and citizens.
States should consider banning TPF entirely, at least 
until the international investment regime can be 
reformed toward more balanced agreements. States 
currently not allowing TPF in their domestic legal 
systems should maintain this ban, at least for TPF in 
investment arbitration. States should also take steps to 
ban TPF in their BITs and the investment chapters of 
regional free trade agreements (FTAs). Finally, states 
should seek collective action opportunities to exercise 
leadership multilaterally, and should work to support 
a TPF ban in the arbitral rules of the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
and the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL), among others. By acting in 
concert, states can minimize any real or perceived risks 
of alienating foreign investment or investment arbitration 
business through unilateral bans.
If TPF is to be allowed in ISDS, the regime should 
require mandatory, expansive disclosure of TPF 
agreements, coupled with mandatory security for 
costs.11 While there is growing consensus that the 
existence and identity of a TPF funder should be 
disclosed, such disclosure should go further and include 
the terms of funding agreements. Such disclosure aligns 
well with general institutional trends toward increased 
transparency and highlights funding agreement 
provisions that create perverse incentives. Such 
expansive disclosure will also provide the much-needed 
data for future research into the benefits and harms 
involved in TPF and enable more effective regulation 
going forward. Mandatory security for costs can help 
disincentivize TPF funders from pursuing weak cases 
merely for their settlement value.
11 See Thrasher, R. D. (2018). The regulation of third party funding: Gathering 
data for future analysis and reform. Boston College Law School Law and Justice 
in the Americas Working Paper No. 9. Retrieved from http://lawdigitalcommons.
bc.edu/ljawps/9
12 International Council for Commercial Arbitration (ICCA). (2018, April). Report 
of the ICCA–Queen Mary task force on third-party funding in international arbitration. 
Retrieved from http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/10/40280243154551/
icca_reports_4_tpf_final_for_print_5_april.pdf
Although there is currently no across-the-board 
requirement to disclose the presence or identity 
of TPF funders, some promising steps have been 
taken. The International Council for Commercial 
Arbitration (ICCA)/Queen Mary Report on Third-Party 
Funding, while timid in its assessment and in terms of 
recommendations, does call for limited disclosure.12 On 
the regulatory front, Article 8.26 of the Canada–European 
Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) includes mandatory disclosure of the presence 
and identity of TPF funders, while Article 23(1) of the 
Singapore Investment Arbitration Commission (SIAC) 
rules gives the tribunal the discretionary authority to order 
disclosure of the details of the agreement as well. States 
should build on these beginnings, while recognizing that 
the benefits of disclosure come at the cost of accepting in 
the meantime a rapidly growing TPF presence in ISDS 
and foregoing the broad systemic benefits of a TPF ban.
Conclusion
It is critically important that states, their negotiators, 
academics and civil society take a careful, public, 
transparent and sustained look at the risks that TPF poses 
to the public and to the investment regime itself. Rather 
than be positioned as a fait accompli, TPF should be properly 
regulated, if not eliminated outright. Otherwise, we risk 
looking back at this period as we do at the prelude to the 
global financial crisis, as a story of opportunities missed.
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